Military Strategy and Operational Art, Joining the Fray: Outside Military Intervention in Civil Wars

Military Strategy and Operational Art, Joining the Fray: Outside Military Intervention in Civil Wars

Zachary C. Shirkey

Language: English

Pages: 229

ISBN: 2:00318049

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Building on his earlier volume, Is this a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join?, Zachary C. Shirkey looks at how the decision to join a civil war can be intuitively understood as follows: given that remaining neutral was wise when a war began something must change in order for a country to change its beliefs about the benefits of fighting and join the war. This book studies what these changes are, focusing in particular on revealed information and commitment problems.

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removed or some combination of these. None seriously considered becoming involved in the conflict. Given that no outside states other than Russia came close to joining, the rest of this chapter will focus on Russian decisionmaking and the events within the war which influenced that decision-making. The Course of the War through the Battle of Kápolna The Hungarians rose against Austrian rule on 15 March 1848 in an initially bloodless revolution in Pest. As mentioned above, this was but one of the

into Beirut. There should be no doubt these Palestinian forces were acting at the behest of the Syrian government. As Kamil Sham’un, the Lebanese Minister of the Interior, a member of the National Liberal Party, and a Syrian opponent stated, It is very hard to differentiate between the Syrian Army and those military formations which are commanded by a number of Syrian officers and in whose ranks an additional number of Syrian officers fight unofficially. Let us not forget that all of the

previous objections was met.97 The meeting apparently climaxed with a pointed exchange. Jumblat exclaimed, “Let us teach them [the Maronites] a lesson! The matter must be resolved militarily. They have governed us for 140 years; we want to get rid of them now!”98 To which Assad replied, “Do not rely on our support.”99 After the meeting, Jumblat kept up the joint LAA-LNM offensive in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. This led to Syria imposing an arms embargo on the LNM and issuing propaganda which

2006, 39. Clark backs up his claim in part using statements from an Ugandan journalist, Robert Kabushenga, that Museveni was unaware of the planning of the Rwandan attack. Atzili (2006) claims Uganda participated in the airlift, but cites only Clark as a source which can easily be discounted given Clark’s own position that Uganda was not involved in the initial strike. 81  Clark 2001, 262–3. He did not consult parliament or other civilian leaders. 82  Clark 2002b, 153. 83  Ibid, 149; Clark 2001,

Angolan forces quickly defeated the Rwandan strike force which had to be evacuated using UNITA air bases. The Angolans saw intervention as all the more vital as UNITA was gearing up for a December 1998 offensive within Angola. By moving Angolan troops into Congo, Angola would be able to cut UNITA supply lines and blunt the offensive, while if nothing was done, UNITA’s supply lines would be protected by friendly Rwandan forces and a puppet Congolese government.108 Still, this left the eastern

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